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Review Article

Controversial Project Siting

State Policy Instruments and Flexibility

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Euston Quah and K .C. Tan, *Siting Environmentally Unwanted Facilities: Risks, Trade-offs, and Choices*, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2002.

John Weingart, *Waste Is a Terrible Thing to Mind: Risk, Radiation, and Distrust of Government*, Princeton, Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 2001.

Gregory McAvoy, *Controlling Technocracy: Citizen Rationality and the NIMBY Syndrome*, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 1999.

Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998.

S. Hayden Lesbirel, *NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1998.

While the terrain of NIMBY politics is well-tread in studies of local and environmental politics, it receives considerably less systematic attention in comparative political research and theory.[1] Viewed as local, episodic movements that often fade quickly, other than noting their existence there seems little to be learned from such state-society encounters. However, since the 1960s citizen opposition to state projects have cost not only time and money, but in some cases even lives. In Japan the prolonged struggle over Narita Airport claimed ten lives, injured hundreds, and resulted in over 400 acts of guerrilla warfare and sabotage. In South Korea, during a 10,000 citizen protest against a proposed radioactive waste disposal site, rioters burned a police station to the ground.[2] In Creys-Malville, France, in 1977 thousands of antinuclear activists battled riot police, and in the ensuing battles one citizen was killed and another five seriously wounded.

How states manage contentious civil society remains a critical but undertheorized area. Authorities have at their disposal a wide spectrum of potential policy instruments in handling citizens who challenge the state, and researchers, while drawing up lists of tools available to states which seek to coopt or dampen citizen resistance,

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have yet to create consistent theories about the logic underscoring their use or development.[3] Some governments consistently use expropriation and coercion to respond to social and local citizens' movements, while others develop new methods or deepen their existing strategies. New research on the politics of controversial facilities provides a lens through which to view the variety of strategies used in the handling of contentious politics because of the asymmetrical distribution of costs and benefits inherent in such projects. The books under review raise issues that inform both the knowledge and practice of social science: the importance of timing and sequence, of the use of multiple methodologies in investigating phenomena, and the consideration of states not in terms of the standard evaluators of strength and weakness, but rather in terms of levels of flexibility in handling contestation.

In concert with rising environmental consciousness, demands for citizen participation and procedural transparency have increased in the past twenty years. More and more communities in the United States have claimed that they have been the victim of environmental racism, that is, chosen for unwanted facilities such as waste dumps and incinerators because of their high numbers of ethnic and racial minorities.[4] This issue's relevance can only increase in the future as societies struggle to handle burgeoning populations and rising demands for energy, transportation infrastructure, and waste disposal. Recently, social scientists have begun to approach this undertheorized field from a variety of angles, touching on vital issues not only for political scientists, but for citizens and decision makers as a whole. Their work is systematic and serious and is focused on not only local, but also national politics and institutions.

Characteristics of Opposition to Controversial Facilities

The conflicts between state and society in NIMBY politics, while located within the larger genre of contentious politics, stand out from typical conflicts between states and civil societies. Although states faced citizen opposition since the early postwar days, citizen mobilization and resistance, especially to potentially hazardous facilities like nuclear power plants, increased dramatically over the past thirty years.[5] Constructing facilities seen as necessary by the state but undesirable by local communities puts pressure on bureaucrats different from that found with short-term, low salience issues. Because of the enormous capital requirements and long lead times for these facilities, businesses can not handle them alone. Due to the market failures of such projects, governments are regularly directly involved in managing and constructing, if not subsidizing and assisting, their creation.[6] States face pressing time demands with projects like bioweapon laboratories, energy plants, and high speed rail lines; stalled or suspended projects increase future electoral and economic costs for their construction.

In many cases, failure to site the project in one period does not mean that the project will die. Rather, state authorities will try again in another location or in the same spot at a later time. Thus, these issues are not one shot interactions with the public; licensing, construction, and management provide access points and opportunities for civil society groups over periods spanning decades at times. In Japan, for example, attempts to construct nuclear power plants in Higashid_ri in Aomori prefecture and in Kaminoseki in Yamaguchi prefecture have taken nearly three decades because of local resistance. Time period is particularly important because political scientists have shown the drastic differences between single shot and repeated interactions.[7] In long-term engagements actors must carefully consider their choices in light of future interactions.

Studies of Japan, the United States, France, Germany, and Mexico show the global character of citizen opposition to controversial facilities.[8] While some communities and citizens may demonstrate against them, others occasionally seek the economic benefits that accompany these projects.[9] Communities in France, including Penly and Flamanville, have volunteered to host the new European Pressurized reactor (EPR), while Japan's Mutsu City offered to host interim radioactive waste storage. Nonetheless, those who view these facilities as purely public goods ignore the local "public bads" of the projects, which while providing benefits to many concentrate costs on a few.

Why do these facilities generate strong citizen mobilization and often violent action? Quah and Tan rightly emphasize that the "[s]iting of a NIMBY facility therefore results in an asymmetric distribution of the costs and benefits involved. A disproportionate share of the risks and costs accrue to the local residents, whereas the benefits tend to go to outside residents."[10] Citizens often view these facilities as dangerous to health and detrimental to property values. Since the benefits from nuclear power plants, waste facilities, and dumps go primarily to urban dwellers, the rural communities that often host them see few incentives for them to accept such projects voluntarily in their backyards. By creating geographically defined communities that bear the burden of negative externalities, these projects create an environment in which local citizens encounter the selective incentives necessary for rapid citizen mobilization and overcome typical collective action problems.[11]

Local residents, because of their proximity to a planned nuclear power plant or waste incinerator, can more easily locate, connect with, and sanction potential allies against the project. James Wilson pointed out that, "[w]hen a specific, easily identifiable group bears the cost of a program conferring distributed benefits, the group is likely to feel its burden keenly and thus to have a strong incentive to organize" to decrease their externalities.[12] Even if regular opinion polls show majority support in potential host communities for such projects, large turnouts at antifacility demonstrations and even violence may result from citizen opposition.[13] In many cases vocal minorities can stall or shut down projects that may be in the interest of the

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majority of the host community. State policy instruments to manage or prevent opposition vary considerably across nations.

Tools

Ever since Max Weber, political scientists distinguish states from other organizations by their "monopoly over physical force."[14] But as Machiavelli observed: "... for the lion is liable to be trapped, whereas the fox cannot ward off wolves. One needs, then, to be a fox to recognize traps, and a lion to frighten away wolves."[1] Princes that are cunning and strong as appropriate always succeed better than those that are only lions. While force defines a state, Machiavelli's observation suggests that a state relying on force may be only a minimal state, quite prone to falling in traps set by opponents.[2] While modern states remain coercive organizations, successful states do more than just "power." They also structure, pay off, and persuade. The modern state is distinguished from its ancestors as much by the incredible scope as by the accumulation of its powers.

However, despite these developments, not all states can or do choose to be lions or foxes to accomplish their plans. Some, best known as predatory states, do little more than extract resources and protect the state interests necessary for their survival. Others regularly accomplish a diverse array of public works despite considerable citizen resistance. Machiavelli's metaphor poses a central conundrum in understanding the spectrum of modern states: all states are part, if not all, lion, but not all states are part fox. Why some states develop this capacity, while others do not, may go far in enhancing explanations of political development but may also answer why some are more successful than others.

Advanced industrial democracies have access to a broad array of policy instruments in handling citizen opposition, ranging from "brute force coercion" to tools designed to bring public opinion in line with the state preferences.[3] As Schattschneider accurately pointed out, "the crucial problem in politics is the management of conflict."[4] State agencies responsible for the siting of controversial facilities seek simultaneously to dampen existing opposition from local and regional antifacility groups and to prevent the emergence of future contention. All agencies hope to coopt resistance before it begins and seek voluntary cooperation from local communities when building such projects, but the ways in which states seek these goals or respond to challenge should initial conciliation be unsuccessful are strikingly different.

Some bureaucratic agencies use policy instruments with direct effects to counter the spread of organized contention, such as the arrest of protest leaders and the suppression of demonstrations, while others use persuasive strategies, such as rewards

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for cooperative localities and educational curricula, to dampen and prevent the emergence of new opposition. Through a comparative analysis of how states create and deploy tools to manage contentious civil societies it is possible to gain larger insights into the democratic process.

There are four main clusters of policy instruments. Powering tools, available to all states, even predatory ones, draw on the state's legitimate use of force and affect their targets immediately. Such strategies are visible to all onlookers and often rest on state powers like eminent domain, monopoly over coercive force, and the ability to cut funds and subsidies. Structuring tools seek to structure the political arena and set the agenda so that the state can control the venue and outmaneuver citizen opponents. Some states, for example, have shut down access to licensing procedures for nuclear power plants in the hope of preventing citizen interveners from sabotaging the process. Instruments that pay off opponents use side payments, subsidies, and grants to induce cooperation from otherwise reticent citizens. Persuading tools involve policy instruments often hidden from view that seek to alter citizen preferences, bringing citizens' interests in line with state plans. Educational curricula for schools in potential host communities and awards ceremonies for cooperative local government officials would be examples of such policy instruments. Table 1 summarizes the main types of policy instruments along with their time horizons, types of power, visibility, and probability of effectiveness.

Table 1 Clusters of Policy Tools

Policy Instrument	Goal	Time Horizon	Power	Visibility	Effectiveness	Examples
Powering	Punishing resistance	Immediate	Hard	High	High	Coercion; Expropriation; Cutting grants
Structuring	Frustrating opposition	Intermediate	Semi-hard	Medium-low	Medium-high	Agenda-setting; Venue-shopping
Paying Off	Rewarding cooperation	Intermediate	Soft	Medium-high	High	Offering subsidies
Persuading	Changing preferences	Long term	Soft	Low	Low	Education; Habituation

Powering over Citizens: France

Gabrielle Hecht's study focuses on the interaction among politics, culture, and technology in France during the immediate postwar period. She investigates the creation of both the national "technopolitical" regime of nuclear power and national identity in France in the 1950s and 1960s. She underscores how nationalism and views of "Frenchness" affected technological decision making and vice versa. At the core of her narrative is an account of the feuding between the government agency known as the CEA (*Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique*) and the nationalized energy utility EDF (*Électricité de France*), two organizations with manifestly different working styles and goals. She also investigates the regimes and rhythms of work in nuclear plants, along with the various organizational cultures of unions of nuclear workers.

A complete exposition of this book's exquisitely detailed accounts of how workers, technologists, politicians, and union members viewed their roles vis-à-vis technology and self-identity is beyond the scope of this review. Most relevant here is Hecht's investigation of nuclear plant and factory sitings in rural France during the early postwar period. In chapters six and seven Hecht assembles interviews with local residents, scripts from plays, letters, and various archival sources to create a picture of how local residents encountered nuclear facilities and state authorities. The CEA deliberately sited its initial plant, Marcoule, in a rural, sparsely populated area to "avoid alarm or confrontation," and the EDF located similarly its Chinon plant "in the countryside, away from a metropolitan area."[5] Both organizations, even in the early days of nuclear power before the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, sought to avoid alarming citizens and located these projects far from population centers. With Marcoule, Mayor Pierre Boulot saw the plant as a way to revive a flagging local economy, and the CEA in turn framed the plant as one that "rescued Bagnols from the depths of its backwardness."[6] The EDF's proposal for a nuclear power plant, in contrast, triggered only "tempered interest" from local officials, who were concerned about radiation and other hazards.[7]

Overall, Hecht presents the residents' "complex responses to the sites." In an interesting twist on later events, opinion polls in the late 1950s showed that citizens living in Paris were most likely to oppose the siting of a nuclear plant nearby, while those in Normandy and Brittany were most likely to favor a nuclear neighbor.[8] These polls should be investigated more thoroughly, given the often violent resistance in Brittany in the towns of Le Carnet, Plogoff, and Pellerin, which successfully prevented the construction of plants during the mid 1970s.

The methods by which these two organizations handled resistance illuminates several important factors. The CEA's expropriation of land soon became public knowledge. Further, local villagers saw CEA representatives as arrogant and aloof, not only due to their confiscation of private property, but also because of the ways in

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which they informed (or did not inform) local residents of their decisions. In some cases, "villages learned about the arrival of an 'atomic center' not from the CEA or department officials but from a press release," and such behavior caused local municipal councils to issue statements against the plant. Further, because of their military status, plants like Marcoule were exempt from local taxes that could enrich the local government, like the *patente*, a fee levied on all businesses in the department that was based on the previous year's turnover. Some local villages, angered by what they saw as the state's reneging on promises of economic improvement, responded by imposing specific taxes on these facilities. While some villagers lost important land, such as vineyards, to the projects, others learned to "manipulate the state's system to their profit" by bringing in outside experts to raise the asking price for their properties.[9]

The EDF handled the process of siting and community relations differently, although it also expropriated land for its facilities. EDF's plants did pay local taxes, which made some residents "rich—at least compared to their previous incomes."[10] Once the plants were under construction, the two organizations took different approaches to handling opposition. The EDF, free from the constraints of military secrets that enshrouded the CEA's plutonium producing facilities, offered site tours to local residents and sponsored exhibits at local fairs to keep up the positive image of nuclear plant as tourist facility. The CEA closely monitored press reports, and when journalists pointed out the plants' deficiencies, it responded to pressure by increasing its public relations efforts and wining and dining journalists who were supportive of its nuclear program.[11]

Confirming existing accounts of the French nuclear program as insulated from civil society and highly coordinated, Hecht discusses the extremely centralized decision-making processes, focusing on the efforts of the commission known by the acronym PEON (*Production d'Électricité d'Origine Nucléaire*). Many have seen PEON as the ultimate in "technocratic" decision making which initially rubber-stamped decisions placed before it but, as the conflict between EDF and CEA grew, became the arbiter for competing approaches to the nuclear industry.

It is interesting to note how Hecht's account of the state's lack of involvement in nuclear power plant siting contrasts with the EDF's strongly focused attempts on public relations, side payments, and integration with local communities. Had Hecht extended her investigation past the late 1960s and through the period of highest growth, she could have confirmed that the state remained committed to its core strategies of land expropriation and, when necessary, police force and surveillance. The major difficulty in her book is that political scientists used to drier prose might find Hecht's self-reflexive narrative occasionally excessive. Finally, her investigation of "sociopolitical regimes" could have benefited from the incorporation of additional layers of interest group and electoral politics.

Paying Off Opponents: Singapore and the United States

Euston Quah and K .C. Tan's work focuses on the variety of ways governments bargain with host communities over controversial facilities. Adopting an economic approach, they use formal models and statistical analysis to analyze the costs and benefits of facility siting. The authors view the problem through the theoretical lens of economic utility to suggest potential resolutions. Focusing on procedural matters, such as a multicriteria siting process, with particular attention paid to various methods of compensation to affected communities, they conclude that "[a]uction mechanisms involving the payment of compensation can be usefully employed in solving the siting dilemma of NIMBY facilities."[12] They acknowledge the shortcomings of attempts to create cooperation through side payments. Certain communities view monetary compensation as a form of bribery, and such strategies are more likely to achieve public acceptance in low, as opposed to high, risk facilities.[13]

Quah and Tan advance beyond previous studies by carrying out small-scale, laboratory experiments with undergraduates from the National University of Singapore to determine the actual affects of various auction methods. Quah and Tan test auction procedures under a variety of conditions involving fewer or more players and various compensation levels with different parameters.[14] In these auctions, subjects ("players") are informed of their social costs, that is, what they expect the presence of the facility will cost them in terms beyond pure environmental and health externalities. With this cost in mind, the subjects in the experiment then bid against each other for the amount of money they hope to receive in compensation for hosting a noxious facility, not knowing what others have as their social costs. Depending on the type of auction, players with the lowest bids—those demanding the least amount of compensation from the siting authorities—"win" the round and receive the facility in their community.

Quah and Tan demonstrate that, as the "number of players increases, the gap between the bids and costs narrows."[15] This experiment's results indicate that siting authorities would best seek a pool of candidate sites rather than one or two to decrease their compensation costs. The experiments also confirm the hypothesis that, by narrowly limiting the bidding for controversial facilities to a range closer to the actual "reserve price" of players in the game, the bidding price is kept closer to economically efficient outcomes. One implication might be that the state should begin with a rough estimate of the social costs for potential host communities and select those with lower costs (perhaps poorer, rural communities with underrepresented, politically weaker groups). When the government can, through various mechanisms, gain a deeper understanding of the needs of local communities, it can better ensure that the level of compensation will be lower than random attempts or even those based purely on technical criteria.

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Quah and Tan also conducted a medium size-N exploratory research survey (ninety-one respondents) to test various theories about Singaporean citizens' feelings about controversial facilities. Among the interesting outcomes was that trust in bureaucratic agencies contributed greatly to local feelings of trust and well-being about facility siting. Quah and Tan use these results to argue that authorities wishing to maximize their chances for success should ensure that the state plays a visible and large role in safety and oversight. By playing a large and clear role in the siting process the state can at least partially reduce concerns about negative externalities. This work might have benefited from more investigations of the application of these experimental and small group studies to actual cases. If these procedures are not seen at work outside the laboratory, it is only speculation if they will be more effective than standard measures. Quah and Tan's book would be best suited for economics graduate students and political scientists familiar with formal modeling, although the authors do advance concrete and practical suggestions based on their research.[16]

Weingart's book raises related issues about the limits of bargaining and other tools focused on paying off opponents. As the former Executive Director of the New Jersey Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility Siting Board, Weingart's first-hand experience sheds light on many of Quah and Tan's theoretical propositions. Through an in-depth case study of his organization's repeated failures to site a controversial facility in New Jersey between 1995 and 1998, Weingart's wry observations reveal the yawning chasm between theory and practice.

Weingart's organization had a lot going for it. It attempted to learn from failed experiences and was, in its own words, "creative and flexible." The NJLLRWDFSB—the impossible to pronounce or remember acronym for his bureau—offered $2 million per year for fifty years to host communities, along with initial money for testing and surveys, and used a variety of innovative marketing techniques.[17] The siting process employed by New Jersey was completely voluntary, a radical break from older strategies of expropriation and older "decide, announce, defend" tactics based on top-down, geographical screening approaches that had failed to procure a site for the waste. The state was even willing to compensate landowners for property devaluation if they could demonstrate that their homes depreciated due to the facility.

Weingart lays out the additional incentives he and his agency offered that should have helped ensure a successful outcome. New Jersey has a number of currently polluted, uninhabitable that which would be excellent candidates for such a radioactive waste facility, which most scientists describe as very low risk (as opposed to active nuclear power or chemical plants or high level radioactive waste storage facilities, for example, which have more potential for catastrophic failures). Even opponents agreed that the proposed site would be far safer than the current system, in which various operators at more than one hundred sites around the state simply store their medical, research, laboratory, and other radioactive waste on site.[18] Moreover, the

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organization was focused and flexible, "liberated from hiring and budget constraints" and able to try out new techniques as it learned from past failures.[19] The staff remained completely united and targeted on the same goal. The main environmental organizations in the state did not actively oppose the proposed facility. Rather, "[m]ost established environmental groups, if they considered the issue at all, were cautiously supportive."[20] In the end, only twelve municipalities volunteered, and all either backed out of the process or were disqualified before they were able to renege because of technical reasons.

What derailed the process? Weingart argues that small numbers of "vocal and passionate" local citizens, concerned about the image of radioactivity and distrustful of government, were responsible.[21] He also points to the problems involving time, more specifically the duration of time that citizens would have to remain involved in the process. While his bureau assumed that people would be willing to invest as much time in the siting process as they do in important decisions like college admissions, they overestimated typical citizens' interest. A close reading of his case study also reveals that government structure played a key role. Weingart's account illuminates the difficulties of bureaus within federal systems due to overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions among multiple agencies.[22] Here, the larger issue of institutions and institutional environments plays a key role in the process of interaction; even though his own organization was focused and creative, the bureaucratic environment was fragmented and lacked unified goals. There is a happy ending, at least for New Jersey residents and businesses. Despite the failure of Weingart and his staff to find even one location willing to accept low level radioactive waste, the state of New Jersey and all other states with rapidly expanding on site storage of radioactive waste were saved from overcrowded storage facilities by the decision to keep open the storage facility in Barnwell, South Carolina.[23]

Weingart's book underscores the point that side payments and other instruments that pay off opponents are not necessarily the most effective ones. His work's subtitle emphasizes Quah and Tan's point about the need for the government to be clearly behind such programs and the importance of bureaucratic and government structure in determining how states respond to contention. Although Weingart's book lacks a single organizing theory, social scientists will be able to draw testable hypotheses from his extended case study. Still, it was clearly written by a practitioner, for practitioners, not for an academic audience.

Like Weingart, Greg McAvoy focuses on the siting of controversial North American facilities, and like Weingart, his study demonstrates how policy instruments centered on bargaining may also fail to achieve policy success. McAvoy selected attempts to site hazardous waste facilities in Minnesota's Red Lake and Koochiching County because the state serves as an "important and severe test case for examining how citizens can challenge state decision makers."[24] He takes pains to lay out potential arguments about Minnesota's unusual characteristics but argues that

broader conclusions can be inferred nonetheless. McAvoy points out that Minnesota's state government has a reputation as "activist, progressive, and directed toward problem solving" and argues that it provides a critical case in understanding how (or if) citizens can influence policymaking.[25] McAvoy integrates a case study approach with local survey data. His study reveals that, while the state with its monopoly of force could invoke expropriation to site the project, it was reluctant to do so because of the potential public outcry. McAvoy then proceeds to lay out the tactics that the state developed to secure the facility's site.

McAvoy highlights a critical feature of facility siting. Rather than being swayed by public opinion about such projects, as pluralist theorists contend, the state may attempt to influence it. "The use of noncoercive powers suggests the opposite, namely that state officials attempt to enact their policy preferences by altering the preferences of citizens who might rise in opposition to the policy they are pursuing."[26] That is, "state officials do not take societal preferences as fixed but instead attempt to alter them to coincide with their own preferences."[27] State officials used a variety of strategies, including arena-structuring instruments, where the state authorities could better control information flow and access, and financial incentives, which seek to turn a local public bad into more of a public good. The state also undertook public relations campaigns geared to "convince residents in the volunteer counties of the benefits and safety of the stabilization and containment facility."[28]

The Waste Management Board (WMB) employed a sociologist as a consultant to use habituation techniques, taking local residents to existing sites to familiarize them with the "normalcy" of the project.[29] The WMB staged information campaigns, aggressively responding to articles and editorials that misstated the facts of the proposal, and opened an information office to distribute information to local residents. The state also employed moral suasion, where they "tried to convince county residents who opposed it that they were acting narrowly and subverting the general welfare of the state."[30] Despite the wider variety of policy instruments employed by the state, the process fell through, with local referendums going against the facility.

McAvoy surveyed approximately 700 residents in potential host communities to evaluate differences between citizen and elite perceptions and attitudes. Despite state attempts to push compensation, citizens "felt that the compensation was an inappropriate exchange for accepting the facility."[31] At the core of citizens' perceptions were assessments of risk to them and their families and evaluations of need; most local people viewed the facility as unnecessary. This short, clearly written book brings out several important concepts, primarily that states assume citizen preferences to be malleable and therefore changeable. This book would be an excellent assignment for undergraduates and even for graduate students interested in issues of facility siting and public opinion.

Persuading Citizens: Japan

S. Hayden Lesbirel's work on Japanese siting hints at attempts to use preference-altering, persuading tools. Lesbirel analyzes a quantitative dataset focused on the period from 1960 to 1980 with four in-depth case studies. His analysis focuses on the variance in siting times for both traditional fossil fuel plants (coal, oil, gas) and more controversial nuclear reactors. Lesbirel tests how various factors, such as demand for electricity, primary sector employment, and political parties, affect the timing of the building of such plants. He argues that siting takes a shorter period of time when economic opportunities in agriculture or fishing are scarce, when Leftist representation is weak in the prefecture, and when utilities expect future shortages.

Bargaining power, "the ability to get others to do what they would normally not do," provides the theoretical frame of reference for his analysis.[32] Moving away from timeworn attempts at explaining Japanese "exceptionalism" or behavior in terms of shared cultural norms, he emphasizes that "[c]ultural explanations are not necessary to account for observed variations" (nor could they explain them, as a Japanese culture would affect all observations in the same way). Lesbirel notes the various institutionalized compensation mechanisms put in place by the Japanese central government, among them the Three Laws (*Dengen Sanp_*) and nationwide compensation standards for fishing cooperatives. He also points out that France and Japan, unlike the U.S., created structures to better assist both public and private actors in their goals of siting controversial facilities.

Siting authorities, usually private utilities, employed different strategies to manage opposition, including visits to power plant sites. Such habituation techniques were successful in creating positive images of nuclear power especially in concert with promised economic benefits.[33] Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party used a "divide and conquer" strategy to remove one local leader opposed to the Hamaoka plant.[34] Lesbirel explores cases in Ashihama, Hamaoka, Matsushima, and Tomari, showing how statistical predictions measure up to actual events.

Lesbirel focuses on the property rights holders, especially fishing cooperatives, who figure prominently in local opposition. The central government extended benefits and a variety of incentive programs to these groups and not only to the private utility companies. While Lesbirel mentions the creation of jobs through the development of local fishing farms, the central government itself sponsored a number of such projects. Lesbirel notes that, "even though the Three Laws were set up to provide compensation for non-owners of property rights," fishing cooperatives have benefited greatly from the accompanying benefits. He concludes that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, the primary regulator and promoter of nuclear power) delegated most responsibility for siting to private utilities. Lesbirel's book underscores the role of both private and state actors in the siting

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process, along with the importance of combining multimethod, historical analysis. Although Lesbirel identifies bargaining power as the main theoretical framework, a tighter fit between case study, quantitative analysis, and theory would have improved its explanatory power. Despite any shortcomings, this short work would be an excellent choice for scholars and students interested in detailed explanations of Japanese public policy.

While not discussed at length, scholarship on Japanese nuclear power plant siting revealed the extent of state involvement in siting nuclear reactors. Lesbirel's own quantitative analysis indicates that the government's concern over energy shortages affects the amount of time to build power plants.[35] Moreover, Japan nurtured its nuclear industry, supported the development of a closed fuel cycle, and sought to bring the public preferences in line with state goals. The size and complexity of the Three Laws redistribution system necessitated the creation of two more public institutions devoted to providing side payments to both existing and potential host communities. The MITI's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) gave "pep talks" to hesitant local communities, flew in mayors for training not only in nuclear information but also on how to "sell" the reactors to their constituents, and provided jobs and income streams to local fishing cooperatives that hold veto powers over the process. The prime minister officially recognizes cooperative local officials at award ceremonies.

On top of these efforts, the Japanese state established atomic energy centers that promote nuclear power as safe and necessary, sent out teams of scientists to lecture at schools, and developed pronuclear science curricula for middle school students. ANRE moved to counter strategies from antinuclear groups like the Citizen Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) and demonstrated a remarkable flexibility in designing new tactics and institutions to handle contention. Further, unlike France, the Japanese state never used expropriation to acquire land for nuclear power plants despite its legal powers.[36] The Japanese government moved beyond its available tool kit to develop new policy instruments to manage contentious politics. All of these works raise larger issues of tool use and state responses.

A Logic of Tool Use

Although a full discussion of this research goes beyond the scope of this review, it is possible to sketch out a logic of tool use. When states face small and distinct civil society opponents, they have little incentive to move away from coercive approaches. Time horizons also seem to influence policy instrument selection. When bureaucracies believed they faced problems that needed to be solved quickly, they were willing to absorb short-term criticism in exchange for a resolution to the conflict. Without allies or an interested civil society, the coerced groups hold little leverage against

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democratic states. Thus, faced with the oil shock, French authorities used expropriation and police repression against antinuclear organizations. Without allies to assist in their cause and marginalized by the state, antinuclear movements in France found themselves at the fringes of public opinion.

In North America authorities handling nuclear waste disposal encountered local but acute opposition to their siting plans. Relying primarily on bargaining strategies, relevant institutions found themselves unable to keep up with small but vocal opponents who outmaneuvered their attempts to control the venue or set the agenda. In circumstances where states face broad, mobilized groups of contentious citizens and a longer time horizon, such as Japanese nuclear power, the state moved from coercion toward persuasion as a strategy. The deep and persistent nature of antinuclear protest pushed Japanese energy bureaucracies to develop more subtle, preference-altering tools like educational curricula and submerged subsidies.

Additional Implications: Patterns of State Response

This often inward-looking literature on NIMBY politics also provides access to the poorly understood topic of institutional change, specifically bureaucratic and state adaptability under citizen pressure. Previous work on citizen resistance centers on policy outcomes, that is, whether the facility is built or not. Recent research instead focuses on perhaps the more important issue of the policy processes by which states reach outcomes.

The conventional view of bureaucratic agencies and other state organizations under pressure is that they are clumsy leviathans with "strong thumbs, no fingers," unable or unwilling to adapt national plans to local conditions.[37] Critics regularly lament the slow- moving nature of bureaucracies due to their rigid adherence to standard operating procedure.[38] Bureaucratic policy change, when it occurs, moves in cautious increments where authorities make stepwise adjustments to changes in their environment.[39] Organizational behaviorists observe that institutional "competency traps" prevent new skills from emerging.[40] Thus, state agencies can become locked into standard responses. Further, research on path dependence reveals the difficulty of shifting policy tracks.[41] States "do not adapt swiftly and effortlessly" to their environments.[42] One team of researchers noted that most "[m]odels of policymaking are generally based on twin principles of incrementalism and negative feedback."[43]

Despite conventional wisdom regarding the inertial, slow-moving nature of states, studies have revealed numerous examples of rapid change in bureaucracies under pressure recently. Citizen demands for transparency, public participation, and privatization, along with the war on terrorism, have put enormous pressure on democratic states to adapt quickly.[44] Japan responded to demands for more transparent administrative procedures, allowing citizens greater access to information, decision-making

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processes, and the courts.[45] Such rapid changes away from a status quo position are often labeled punctuated equilibrium.[46] Studies of public policy and institutional change consist heavily of case studies of rare exogenous shocks that force policy-makers to adapt to new circumstances.[47]

Much recent research on political organizations focuses on how institutions respond (or fail to respond) through policy or structural change under changing environmental conditions, such as internal or external pressure.[48] Along with the specific types of tactics that states can use or create to better handle or prevent contention, these works hint at some robust patterns of state institutions' response to contentious political groups. Table 2 summarizes four ideal types of state response. In the immobilist response, the state demonstrates low flexibility in choosing policy instruments, a minimum of monitoring of local events, and no link between its strategies and those of its citizen challengers. Incrementalist responses involve slow, step-like changes in existing policies in response to pressure. In a punctuated equilibrium response, a large, exogenous shock pushes the state to innovate and move away from past practice, but state policies and institutions then remain stable at a new status quo. The adaptive response involves an agency demonstrating high flexibility in choosing its policy instruments, constant monitoring of local events, and a strong link between its policies and those of contentious civil society.

In some cases, state authorities demonstrated flexibility and adaptability when handling contestation, but only after events dictated their course. Weingart's description of New Jersey's waste board, for example, shows how a small bureaucracy moved away from failed past practices to try a more voluntary approach based on incentives. The Japanese state displayed great agility in its handling of antinuclear contestation by creating and then upgrading institutions specifically geared to handle opposition tactics. Their French counterparts remained immobilist.

Table 2 State Response Patterns

	High Capacity Bureaucracy	**Low Capacity Bureaucracy**
Strong, Sustained Opposition	*Adaptive* (Japanese nuclear siting)	*Punctuated equilibrium* (N. American nuclear waste siting)
Short, Weaker Opposition	*Immobilist* (French nuclear siting)	*Incrementalist*

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However, adaptive responses do not necessarily bring more success than less flexible responses. Japan and France, while employing completely different sets of tools in handling antinuclear contention, built roughly the same number of nuclear plants. Japan's adaptive responses encountered far more failures. Out of approximately ninety siting attempts, where a geographically suitable area was labeled as a potential host community and planners sought to construct a reactor, only about half succeeded. France's immobilist approach, relying primarily upon powering tools, resulted in the successful completion of more than ninety percent of initial attempts over the same period.[49]

Future Directions

These important books raise the issues of timing, sequence, and multiple methodologies and challenge traditional assumptions about democratic practice in state policymaking. They also illuminate future research projects based not on issues of state strength and weakness, but rather on levels of flexibility. Just as analyses of the varieties of capitalism and the worlds of welfare capitalism focus less on which regimes are most successful, so too these studies move away from narrow issues of siting success or failure to investigate the choice and development of policy instruments states use to influence civil society. This comparative research can assist social scientists in identifying cross-national variations in social management and control.

All of these works emphasize that states are not necessarily influenced by public opinion or even large-scale interests, as pluralists and others purport. Rather, the state often attempts to persuade citizens, especially those most likely to be affected. McAvoy shows how the assumption of malleable public preference led to efforts to bring them in line with state goals. Similarly, Lesbirel shows how the state tried to structure citizen preferences and control various venues and arenas to ensure a more favorable reception of its nuclear power plant siting goals. Weingart's bureau used various incentives and public relations campaigns to try to alter public opinion about radioactive waste, while Quah and Tan demonstrated the importance of monitoring local conditions to make compensation more efficient.

Hecht's work underscores that certain states may completely overlook local opinion, confiscating private property and excluding citizens completely from the decision-making process. Bureaucracies often adopted the language of transparency, deliberative democracy, and popular sovereignty in public relations campaigns but generally did not live up to these lofty concepts.[50] Despite their rhetoric, state agencies have not ceded procedural control to citizens, but rather often seek to mollify concerns about their "nondemocratic procedures" through symbolic gestures toward accountability and improved public participation. Advanced industrial democracies

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did not move to create programs in response to constituents; rather, authorities in the government moved to shift citizen preferences to reduce opposition to state plans. States justified their plans as necessary, often stressing energy independence, for example, but their strategies often involved changing preferences.

These works also reveal the importance of future research that focuses not on the amount of power or resources available, but rather on how power is used. While previous research envisioned state-society relationships in terms of state "strength" or "weakness," these works emphasize the importance of investigating the flexibility of different states.[51] Japan and France are commonly viewed as "strong states," but France did not move beyond coercion and expropriation, while Japan demonstrated greater flexibility in handling antinuclear contention. States may in fact be driven to higher levels of agility by their interaction with contentious civil society. Ikenberry emphasized the relationship between state capacity and "flexibility of state action—the ability of government to provide itself with the broadest array of options" over other typical measures of government control or development.[52] The focus should be on the flexibility or rigidity of various state agencies rather than on states' strength or weakness.

Agility here means the capacity to move away from standard operating procedures and typical state responses toward the creation of innovative tactics that use less visible social control technologies rather than the full force of the state on citizens. Bureaucratic agencies with more strategies in their tool kit can better handle future opposition from civil society in a variety of arenas than ministries with a single, dominant strategy. The tool kit of responses may in fact be a function of protest, so that states encountering longer protest cycles develop more instruments than those that have been free from major opposition. As a result, state response and civil society capacity may develop interactively, so that avoiding coercion may encourage citizens to become involved in politics, which in turn creates a cycle of state innovation. Consequently, the use of coercive approaches has the opposite effect, stifling the mobilization of opposition groups. In France, for example, the state's use of force at the height of the antinuclear movement brought about a sharp decrease in opposition activity against the state. Killing a Superphoenix Fast Breeder Reactor protestor in 1977, France marginalized an active and vibrant group within civil society.[53] Such works identify an important future research direction: looking backward to see how bundles of policy tools came into existence.

Most of these works examine only a short time frame, even when they have long-term considerations. Recent works by a variety of political scientists have stressed the importance of pursuing research not just on short period cases, but also within larger historical arcs. Hecht and Lesbirel trace the nuclear power field for up to two decades in some cases, and their analyses are consequently more convincing. A long-term approach is critical because shorter term analyses often result in inaccurate visions of the phenomenon under investigation. When state agencies use persua-

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sive tactics, such as educational campaigns or other preference altering instruments, their effects can take years to manifest. Studies investigating only a short period of time would overlook these important but often slow-moving processes of state-civil society interaction. As one scholar argued, "[s]napshots hive off important aspects of the problem of institutional development, yielding misleading conclusions."[54] Future research should take the role of time seriously in investigations of politics.

Most of these works exemplify the excellent use of multiple methodologies to tackle the often messy politics of citizen opposition. Hecht combined public opinion surveys, archival research, and intensive interviews to gain a better picture of how citizens viewed nuclear power plants. Quah and Tan used experimental research along with poll data to better gauge how people respond to siting methods. McAvoy used an in-depth case study alongside analysis of survey data to better understand technocratic decision making. Lesbirel demonstrated not only a deep knowledge of nuclear power plant negotiations gained through long-term, intensive field work but also a desire to locate statistically significant patterns in multiple cases. The strongest forthcoming research will no doubt employ similar hybrid methodological approaches, overcoming traditional barriers between qualitative and quantitative research.

In the future, as the demand for energy and waste disposal increases, NIMBY conflicts will only grow in number and size. Citizens will continue to pressure authorities to limit or discontinue their projects, while the need for these facilities will become more acute. Reversing the popular environmental slogan of "think globally, act locally," NIMBY politics will increasingly be to "think locally, act globally" as the conflicts play themselves out in national and international arenas. The new, comparative studies on facility siting begins to untangle and appreciate the national and international dimensions of the problems involved. If this new scholarship is indicative of political science's contribution, there is much to look forward to.

NOTESs

I wish to thank Christian Brunelli, Ezra Suleiman, Susan Pharr, and the editors of *Comparative Politics* for their comments and suggestions.

1. NIMBY is an abbreviation of "Not in My Back Yard." It is the protest of citizens who oppose construction of facilities in their neighborhood. Scholars have created a large vocabulary of whimsical acronyms to label the various strands of citizen opposition, including Locally Unwanted Land Use (LULU), Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere, Near Anyplace (BANANA), and Not on Planet Earth (NOPE). Many observers object to the use of such terms because of the accompanying negative connotations of selfish local interests with drawbridge mentalities that act out of ignorance, while others embrace them as symbols of local political involvement. For political scientists, the phrase has little analytical value, but I use it because of familiarity. For earlier works on controversial facilities, see Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, *The Atom Besieged: Extraparliamentary Dissent in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981); Alain Touraine, Zsuzsa Hegedus, François Dubet, and Michel

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Wieviroka, *Anti-Nuclear Protest: The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); David Apter and Nagayo Sawa, *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); and Christian Joppke, *Mobilizing against Nuclear Energy: A Comparison of Germany and the United States* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

2. Herbert Inhaber, "NIMBY and LULU," *Cato Review of Business and Government* (2001).

3. See Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, "Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools," *The Journal of Politics*, 52 (May 1990), 510–29; Mark Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

4. See Luke W. Cole and Sheila R. Foster, *From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement* (New York: New York University Press, 2001); Andrew Hurley, *Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana 1945–1980* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Mark Atlas, "Rush to Judgment: An Empirical Analysis of Environmental Equity in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Actions," *Law and Society Review*, 35 (2001), 633–82.

5. Eugene Rosa and Riley Dunlap, "Poll Trends: Nuclear Power: Three Decades of Opinions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58 (1994), 295–324.

6. Etel Solingen, *Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Euston Quah and K. C. Tan, *Siting Environmentally Unwanted Facilities: Risks, Trade-offs, and Choices* (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2002), p. 12.

7. Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

8. Apter and Sawa; David Groth, "Biting the Bullet: The Politics of Grass-Roots Protest" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1987); McAvoy; Nelkin and Pollak; Touraine, Hegedus, Dubet, and Wieviroka; Joppke; Velma Garcia-Gorena, *Mothers and the Mexican Antinuclear Power Movement* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).

9. Michele Hoyman, "Prisons in North Carolina: Are They a Viable Strategy for Rural Communities?," *International Journal of Economic Development*, S.P.A.E., Special Volume on Community Economic Development (2001).

10. Quah and Tan, p. 5.

11. See Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964).

12. James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 334.

13. Georges Lamiral, *Chronique de trente années d'équipement nucléaire à Electricité de France* (Paris: Association pour l'histoire de l'électricité en France, 1988).

14. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.

15. Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), ch. 18.

16. Civil rights activists in the 1960s deliberately sought out media opportunities where local law enforcement used hoses, police dogs, and truncheons on unarmed marchers to provide themselves with sympathetic nationwide media coverage. Some authorities learned from these experiences and avoided direct confrontation with protestors, denying the movement media attention.

17. Thomas C Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

18. Elmer Eric Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 71.

19. Gabrielle Hecht, *The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 166, 182.

20. Ibid., p. 212.

21. Ibid., p. 221.

22. Ibid., p. 248.
23. Ibid., pp. 250, 251.
24. Ibid., p. 264.
25. Ibid., p. 233.
26. Quah and Tan, p. 53.
27. Ibid., pp. 26, 128.
28. Auction methods include the atypical Dutch and inverse Dutch auctions, in which the auctioneer starts with an initial price (in this case the amount communities want as compensation for hosting such a facility) and then lowers it successively until the lowest bidder for the project is found.
29. Quah and Tan, p. 77.
30. Quah and Tan also review various site selection procedures and use them as a base to propose a five stage process involving a proposal, environmental impact and benefit-cost analysis, mitigation and compensation, compensation auction mechanisms, and then further negotiations with affected residents.
31. Weingart describes how staff printed up T-shirts with their bureau's acronym. John Weingart, *Waste Is a Terrible Thing to Mind: Risk, Radiation, and Distrust of Government* (Princeton: Center for Analysis of Public Issues, 2001) p. 21.
32. Ibid., p. 381.
33. Ibid., p 398.
34. Ibid., p. 352.
35. Ibid., p. 376.
36. Ibid., p. 302
37. This solution, of course, merely pushes the problem elsewhere. It now sits in South Carolina's back yard rather than New Jersey's.
38. Gregory McAvoy, *Controlling Technocracy: Citizen Rationality and the NIMBY Syndrome* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1999), p. 12.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 62.
41. Ibid., p. 82. Other scholars also emphasize that democratic states regularly interfere in "natural" preference orderings, taking citizen preferences as malleable and seeking to bring them in line with state goals. See Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
42. McAvoy, p. 71.
43. Ibid., p. 72.
44. Ibid., p. 76.
45. Ibid., p. 109.
46. Hayden Lesbirel, *NIMBY Politics in Japan: Energy Siting and the Management of Environmental Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), p. 9.
47. Ibid., pp. 89–90.
48. Ibid., p. 93.
49. Ibid., p. 45.
50. See Daniel P. Aldrich, "The Limits of Flexible and Adaptive Institutions: The Japanese Government's Role in Nuclear Power Plant Siting over the Post-War Period," in S. Hayden Lesbirel and Daigee Shaw, eds., *Managing Conflict in Facility Siting: An International Comparison* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2005), pp. 111–36.
51. Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 65–89. See also James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

52. Morton Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage, and Christine M. Marwick, *The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Penguin, 1976).

53. Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Michael Hayes, *Incrementalism and Public Policy* (New York: Longman, 1992).

54. Barbara Levitt and James March, "Organizational Learning," *American Review of Sociology*, 14 (1988), 319–40.

55. Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

56. Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 156.

57. Paul Posner, Timothy Conlan, and David Beam, "The Politics That Pathways Make: A Framework for Contemporary Federal Policy Making," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29–31, 2002.

58. Thomas Beierle and Jerry Cayford, *Democracy in Practice: Public Participation in Environmental Decisions* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 2002); Ezra N. Suleiman, *Dismantling Democratic States* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2003).

59. Jonathan Marshall, *Leveraging Accountability: How Freedom of Information Brought Courts into Governance in Japan* (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2003).

60. Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics*, 16 (January 1984), 223–46.

61. Gregory Kasza, "War and Welfare Policy in Japan," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 61 (May 2002), 417–35; Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, *Agendas and Instability in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

62. Pierson, *Politics in Time*; Thelen; Avner Greif and David Laitin, "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change," *American Political Science Review*, 98 (November 2004), 633–52.

63. Aldrich.

64. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Why Deliberative Democracy?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Jürgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996).

65. John Zysman, *Governments, Markets, and Growth* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

66. John Ikenberry, "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s," *International Organization*, 40 (Winter 1986), 136.

67. Elizabeth Boyle, "Political Frames and Legal Activity: The Case of Nuclear Power in Four Countries," *Law and Society Review*, 32 (1998), pp. 141–74.

68. Pierson, p. 140.